Wahrer, Carol Page 1 of 4

Wahrer, Carol Page 2 of 4

Date: May 27, 2004

From: Carol Wahrer 544 Nightingale St. Livermore, CA 94551 (925) 447-8759 cwahrer@comcast.net

To: Mr. Thomas Grim, L-293
U.S. Department of Energy,
National Nuclear Security Administration
Livermore Site Office, SWEIS Document Manager
7000 East Avenue
Livermore, CA 94550-9234

Fax: (925) 422-1776 Email: tom.grim@oak.doe.gov

RE: Comments on the Department of Energy's Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) for Continued Operations at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

Dear Mr. Grim:

1/31.04

2/08.02

Through this letter we are expressing our deep concern with the health and environmental risks posed by the expanded nuclear weapons mission for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) into the indefinite future. We appreciate your focused attention to this matter. Below, we have outlined a number of specific concerns that taken cumulatively, lead us to the conclusion that the Site Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) for the continuing operation of LLNL is so deficient in information and analysis that it must be fixed and re-circulated in draft form. This would allow the community, the regulators, and the legislators to have the opportunity to evaluate the new information that is requested in these comments. Our specific

1. The same day of the public hearings for the SWEIS, April 27, 2004, the Congressional Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations for the Committee on Government Reform held a hearing on the security of nuclear materials. The hearing highlighted potentially insurmountable problems with plutonium and highly enriched uranium at certain Department of Energy (DOE) sites, with a focus on the vulnerability of nuclear materials storage at LLNL. On May 7, 2004, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham delivered a speech on the deficiencies in the security of nuclear materials at LLNL and other DOE sites. The Energy Secretary made a commitment to consider removing the special nuclear materials at LLNL by 2003. This recent acknowledgement by the DOE that security at LLNL is questionable makes it imperative that the SWEIS evaluate an alternative that would remove all special nuclear materials from LLNL. These acknowledgements make this not only a

reasonable option, but one that should be evaluated because it is a foreseeable outcome within the next decade at LLNL.

2/08.02 cont. 2. Instead of reducing the amount of special nuclear materials on-site at LLNL, this plan proposes to more than double the limit for plutonium at Livermore Lab from 1,340 pounds to 3,300 pounds. Additionally, under the Proposed Action, the administrative limit for highly enriched uranium in Bulding 239 would increase from 55 pounds to 110 pounds. Seven million people live in surrounding areas, and residences are built right up to the fence. Plutonium is difficult to store safely because, in certain forms, it can spontaneously ignite and burn. Moreover, it poses a criticality risk when significant quantities are stored in close proximity. The amount of plutonium proposed for LLNL is sufficient to make more than 300 nuclear bombs. Because of the health risks, the proliferation dangers, storage hazards, and very serious security concerns, we believe it is irresponsible to store plutonium, highly enriched uranium and tritium at LLNL. We are calling upon the DOE to de-inventory the plutonium, highly enriched uranium and tritium stocks at LLNL rather than to increase them.

3/34.01 4/33.01,

3. The SWEIS proposes to increase the at-risk limits for tritium ten fold, from just over 3 grams to 30 grams. The SWEIS proposes to increase the at-risk limit for plutonium from 44 pounds to 132 pounds. We believe it is unsafe to increase the amount of tritium and plutonium that can be "in process" in one room at one time. LLNL has a history of criticality violations with plutonium and releases of both tritium and plutonium, making it evident that these amounts should be decreased, rather than increased.

5/27.01

4. This plam will revive a project that was canceled more than 10 years ago because it was dangerous and unnecessary. The project was called Plutonium - Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS). Now it is called the 'Integrated Technology Project'(TIP) and the 'Advanced Materials Program' (AMP). This is a scheme to heat and vaporize plutonium and then shoot multiple laser beams through the vapor to separate out plutonium isotopes. The ITP / AMP is a health risk and a nuclear proliferation nightmare. We believe the ITP and AMP work should be cancelled as the Plutonium AVLIS was cancelled in 1990 - this time permanently.

6/37.01

5. This plan makes Livermore Lab the place to test new manufacturing technologies for producing plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. A pit is the softball-sized piece of plutonium that sits inside a modern nuclear weapon and triggers its thermonuclear explosion. DOE says these new technologies will then be used in a new bomb factory, called the Modern Pit Facility (MPF). Public and Congressional opposition to the MPF has caused its delay this year. The Livermore Lab plutonium pit program goes full-speed ahead in the wrong direction. It will enable the MPF and production of 150 - 450 plutonium bomb cores annually, with the ability to run double shifts and produce 900 cores per year. This production capability would approximate the combined nuclear arsenals of France and China - each year. We call upon the DOE to halt all work on plutonium pit production technologies at Livermore Lab. We believe it is premature for the DOE to spend taxpayer dollars on this technology and the prudent and reasonable outcome is to delay or cancel this project.

March 2005 2-575

Chapter 2 - Comment Documents

LLNL SW/SPEIS

Wahrer, Carol Page 3 of 4

12/14.01

Wahrer, Carol Page 4 of 4

7/26.01 8/26.03	6. This plan will add plutonium, highly-enriched uranium and large quantities of lithium hydride to experiments in the National Ignition Facility mega-laser when it is completed at Livermore Lab. Using these materials in the NIF will increase its usefulness for nuclear weapons development, including for the design of new types of nuclear weapons. It will also make the NIF more hazardous to workers and the environment. This is not only dangerous to people's health and safety, and a proliferation risk, but it is sure to result in an inordinate cost to the taxpayer. No cost estimate associated with this proposal has been released to date. We ask the DOE to cancel these dangerous, polluting, proliferation-provocative and unnecessary new experiments proposed for the NIF.
9/26.04	7. The SWEIS reveals plans to manufacture tritium targets at LLNL. The tritium-filled targets are the radioactive fuel pellets that the NIF's 192 laser beams will "shoot" in an attempt to create a thermonuclear explosion. Producing the targets will increase the amount of tritium that is used in any one room at Livermore Lab from the current limit of just over 3 grams to 30 grams – nearly 10-fold more. In the mid-1990's, LLNL stated that target fabrication was to occur off-site because of LLNL's proximity to large populations. Livermore Lab has a history of tritium accidents, spills and releases. The NIF will increase the amount of airborne radioactivity emanating from LLNL. We call on DOE to cancel plans to manufacture tritium targets for NIF at Livermore Lab. Further, we urge cancellation of the NIF megalaser. Cancellation of NIF is a reasonable alternative that should be fully analyzed in the SWEIS.
10/39.01	8. This plan also calls for Livermore Lab to develop diagnostics to "enhance" the nation's readiness to conduct full-scale underground nuclear tests. This is a dangerous step back to the days of unrestrained nuclear testing. All work at LLML to reduce the time it takes to conduct a full-scale underground nuclear tests should be terminated immediately.
11/35.01	9. This plan mixes bugs and bombs at Livermore. It calls for collocating an advanced bic-warfare agent facility (BSL-3) with nuclear weapons activities in a classified are at Livermore Lab. The plan proposes genetic modification and aerosolization (spraying) with live anthrax, plague and other deadly pathogens. This could weaken the international biological weapons treaty and it poses a risk to workers, the public and the environment here in the Bay Area. The darth SWEIS does not adequately describe these programs, or the unique security, health and environmental hazards they present. Construction should be halted on the portable BSL-3 facility. All plans to conduct advanced bic-warfare agent (BSL-3) research on site at LLNL should be terminated.
	10. There are 108 buildings identified at LLNL as having potential seismic deficiencies relative to current codes. The SWEIS should include

a complete list of these buildings and an accounting of the ones that house or may house hazardous, radiological and bloolgical research materials. LLNL is located within 1 kilometer of two significant earthquake faults, including the Las Positas Fault Zone less than 200 feet from the LLNL boundary. How can we mitigate harm done from an

earthquake that damages these buildings before they are brought up to code? We urge the Livermore Lab to stop any work with hazardous,

12/14.01 radioactive or biological substances that may be occurring in any building that does not comply with federal standards. 11. A contractor will be paid to package and ship more than 1,000 drums of transuranic and mixed transuranic waste to the WIPP dump in New Mexico, yet the SWEIS says this is exempt from environmental review. This work in its entirety must be included in the review. 13/22.01 12. The DOE does not acknowledge in the SWEIS that the double-walled shipping containers described in the document may be replaced by less health - protective single-lined containers. We believe that no waste should be shipped in single-walled containers and the SWEIS should provide a guarantee to that effect. 13. The Purpose and Need statement in the SWEIS relies heavily upon the US Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for an aggressive modernization and manufacturing base within the US nuclear weapons complex. This stands in stark contrast to the binding legal mandate to shift "from developing and producing new weapons designs to dismantling obsolete weapons and maintaining a smaller weapons arsenal*. We believe a revised Purpose and Need statement should accurately reflect the Livermore Lab's 15/01.01 legal responsibility with regard to US law, including US obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Further, the Purpose and Need statement in the SWEIS almost completely omits LLNL's important role in civilian science research. This omission fatally flaws the alternatives analysis in the SWEIS by neglecting to consider the expanded role that civilian science programs at the LLNL could play in the next decade. 16/07.01 The alternatives analysis should be revised to consider LLNL's role in light of the commitments in the NPT and the Livermore Lab's civilian science mission as well as the compelling case for removing special nuclear materials (i.e., plutonium and highly enriched uranium) from the LLNL site. Sincerely, Carol Wahrer 544 Nightingale St. Livermore, CA 94551 (925) 447-8759 cwahrer@comcast.net

2-576 March 2005

Weil, Janet Page 1 of 1

Weinstein, Bonnie Page 1 of 3

Mr. Tom Grim Dept. of Energy, NNSA, L-293 7000 East Avenue Livermore, CA 94550

May 16, 2004

Dear Mr. Grim,

My husband and I recently paid a lot of money for a home in eastern Contra Costa County that we hope to enjoy for many years. We were happy to have our bid accepted in a competitive market, but not at all happy to read news of the EIS on Livermore Lab, an unwelcome neighbor.

Specifically, we object to:

• Putting a bio-warfare agent "facility" in a classified area at Livermore Lab;

 Bringing back the Plutonium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation Project, 2/27.01 I with a large increase of plutonium on site;

3/26.04 | • Manufacturing tritium targets for the NIF megalaser.

The Lab is across the street from a large suburban housing development. It's fairly close to Hwy. 580. It's already a huge safety and health liability for Contra Costa County and the entire Bay Area.

My home dates from 1950, but my politics don't. This isn't the 50's, when so many horrors could be put over on the American public as necessary for our "de fense." Thanks in part to the uproar over (non-existent) WMDs in Iraq, the public, and I include myself and my husband, knows a lot more about the already existing WMDs in our nation - and in our beautiful county! And we don't want them here anymore than we wanted them in Iraq.

4/04.01

NO. NO. NO. What were you DOE people thinking? The residents of the Bay Area do not want 'bugs and bombs' in the same facility, nor an upswing in nuclear proliferation and nollution. We are going to find this country. and pollution. We are going to fight this every step of the way, and we are going to inform others in our network of friends, neighbors and colleagues of the menace that these latest proposed developments present to our health and safety.

6/07.01

The planet is going to run out of accessible oil fairly soon. Why don't you brainiacs at Livermore Lab start working on that challenge, and leave the Cold War era behind? The 50s were a great time for music and baseball, but a really lousy time for US foreign policy and "defense." Join the rest of us in the 21st century, already!

Janet Weil

Janet Weil 1393 Grove Way Concord, CA 94518

Bonnie Weinstein 375 Winfield San Francisco, CA 94110

May 27, 2004

Mr. Tom Grim DOE, NNSA L-293 7000 East Ave. Livermore, CA 94550

Dear Mr. Grim:

The following are my comments in addition to those below.

1/03.01

With all the brilliant minds working together at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, perhaps effort and thought should be given to making war unnecessary, to coming up with a plan to disarm the weapons that exist and to turning our military budget--all of it--into a budget targeted to end human suffering and to supply universal human needs throughout the

We need a "Manhattan Project" to pring peace not build a better bomb!

As a resident of the San Francisco Bay Area I demand that you stop contributing to the death of the planet and the contamination of our environment.

More weapons means more of a chance they will be used or deteriorate into toxic danger.

2/07.01 Turn Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory into a think tank for peace!

Bonnie Weinstein, Bay Area United Against War

*****PLEASE READ FURTHER*****

Please consider this letter with my comments on the environmental and proliferation risks from proposed nuclear weapons development and new plutonium and tritium programs at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

March 2005 2-577 Chapter 2 - Comment Documents LLNL SW/SPEIS

Weinstein, Bonnie Page 2 of 3

Weinstein, Bonnie Page 3 of 3

3/02.01	I write to you because the DOE has prepared a draft Site Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) that proposes to ramp up nuclear weapons activities at the Livermore Lab in Northern California. Livermore Lab is working on the design of a new, high-yield nuclear bunker-buster, called the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator," and I oppose its development. Additionally, I oppose the development of so-called "mini-nukes" and other new nuclear weapons concepts being researched at Livermore Lab.
	Here are my comments on six dangerous new programs being proposed at Livermore Lab.
4/08.02	1. Storage of More Nuclear Materials: This plan will more than double the storage limit for plutonium at Livermore Lab from 1,540 pounds to 3,300 pounds. It would increase the radioactive tritium storage limit from 30 grams to 35 grams. I join California Peace Action and the Livermore-based Tri-Valley CAREs group in calling on DOE to de-inventory the plutonium and tritium stocks at Livermore Lab, not increase them.
5/27.01, 33.01	2. Plutonium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS): This plan will revive a project that was canceled more than 10 years ago because it was dangerous and unnecessary. The project is Plutonium AVLIS. This is a scheme to heat and vaporize plutonium and then shoot multiple laser beams through the hot vapor to separate out plutonium isotopes. To do this, Livermore Lab plans to increase the amount of plutonium that can be used at one time in any one room from 44 pounds to 132 pounds - a 3-fold increase. I join California Peace Action and the Livermore-based Tri-Valley CAREs in calling for cancellation of this project.
6/26.01, 26.03	3. Dangerous New Experiments in the National Ignition Facility Mega-Laser: This plan will add plutonium, highly-enriched uranium and lithium hydride to experiments in the National Ignition Facility (NIF) mega-laser when it is completed at Livermore Lab. Using these materials in the NIF will increase its usefulness for nuclear weapons development. It will also make the NIF more hazardous to workers and the environment. I join California Peace Action and the Livermore-based Tri-Valley CAREs in calling for a close out of the NIF project and termination of plans to use plutonium and other new materials in it.
7/37.01	4. New Technologies for Producing Plutonium Bomb Cores: This plan makes Livermore Lab the place to test new manufacturing technologies for producing plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. A pit is the softball-sized piece of plutonium that ist inside a modern nuclear weapon and triggers its thermonuclear explosion. DOE says these new technologies will then be used in a new bomb core factory, called the Modern Pit Facility (MPF). The Livermore Lab plutonium pit program will enable the MPF and production of

150 - 450 plutonium bomb cores annually, with the ability to run double shifts and produce 900 per year. This production capability would 7/37.01 approximate the combined nuclear arsenals of France and China - each year. I join California Peace Action and the Livermore-based Tri-Valley CAREs in calling for termination of this technology development project. 5. Enhancing Readiness to Resume Full-Scale Nuclear Tests: This plan calls for Livermore Lab to develop diagnostics to "enhance" the nation's readiness to conduct full-scale underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site. This is a dangerous step back to the days of unrestrained 8/39.01 nuclear testing and I join with California Peace Action and Tri-Valley CAREs to oppose any move to "enhance" U.S. readiness to conduct full-scale 6. Mixing Bugs and Bombs: This plan mixes bugs and bombs at Livermore Lab. It calls for collocating an advanced bio-warfare agent research facility with nuclear weapons activities in a classified area at Livermore Lab. The DOE proposes genetic modification and aerosolization (spraying) with live anthrax, plague and other deadly pathogens on site at LLNL. This could weaken the international biological weapons treaty -- and it poses a risk to workers, the public and the environment here in the California. 9/35.01 Interestingly, this program is listed as part of LLNL's "no action alternative" as though it were an existing program -- even though it is not yet constructed, Tri-Valley CAREs has brought litigation against it, and a federal Judge has issued a "stay" prohibiting the importation of dangerous pathogens into the facility while the lawsuit moves forward. I join Tri-Valley CAREs in opposing the operation of a bio-warfare agent facility at Livermore Lab. I believe the DOE plan to introduce new weapons programs into LLNL will promote a new arms race and escalate the nuclear danger. Further, the DOE proposal to double LLNL's plutonium storage limit to 3,300 pounds and 10/04.01 | triple the amount held "at risk" in any one room increases the environmental threat LLNL poses to the people of California. The SWEIS propels Livermore Lab in exactly the wrong direction. Instead of proposing new weapons projects, DOE should enhance the peaceful, civilian scientific capabilities and mission at Livermore Lab by proposing new, unclassified programs in environmental cleanup, 11/07.01 non-polluting and renewable energy, earth sciences, astrophysics, atmospheric physics and others. The alternative of a "green lab" in Livermore should be pursued instead of the dangerous nuclear weapons future proposed by the Site Wide Environmental Impact Statement. Peace and solidarity, Bonnie Weinstein

2-578 March 2005